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Abstract 
Terms of Trade, Commercial Policy, 
and the Black Market for Foreign Exchange: 
An Empirical Model of Real Exchange Rate Determination 
A model of real exchange rate (RER) determination is presented. The 
model permits long run equilibrium movements in RER to be distinguished from 
its short run disequilibrium dynamics. An important aspect of the model is 
that it explicitly considers the black market premium as one of the 
fundamental determinants of RER. Especially in economies plagued with 
persistent excess aggregate demand, and rapidly depreciating domestic money 
under a regime characterized with currency inconvertibility and highly 
regulated current account transactions, the black market is usually a 
persistent and a growing part of the economy. The model is then applied to 
the case of the Sudan, a less developed country which approximates the 
economic environment described above. 
Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, Department of Economics, University of Gezira, Wad Madani, 
P.O. Box 20, SUDAN. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of real exchange rate (RE~) has assumed a central position in 
the past and current debates in the literature on economic development and 
growth strategies and the more recent literature on structural adjustment and 
economic stabilization. The RER which is generally defined as the relative 
price of tradables to nontradables is taken to be the most important relative 
price signalling for intersectoral growth in the long run. The relevence of 
RER to export promotion and generation of optimal output and employment path 
can easily be shown in rigorous behavioral models of utility and expenditure 
function, example of such literature includes: Edwards (1986a, 1987b), 
Edwards and van Wijnbergen (1986a, 1987), Mussa (1974, 1978), and Pinto (1988) 
. a f In the context of his insightful work in the area of tradeto mention ew. 1 
liberc!.lization and development strategy, Diaz-Alejandro drew from the 
experience of Latin America to argue that RER misalignment and especially RER 
overvaluation, (with respect to the equilibrium RER), can be detrimental to an 
export-oriented development strategy, Diaz-Alejandro (1984). 
There is more than one definition for equilibrium RER (ERER). According 
to Edwards (1987a) for example, ERER is the relative price of tradables to 
nontradables which, for a given sustainable value of other relevent variables 
such as terms of trade, commercial policy, capital and aid flows, and 
technology, results in the simultaneous attainment of internal apd external 
equilibrium. A similar view of ERER is taken in the empirical.part of this 
paper, where the ERER is consistent with the simultaneous equilibriums in the 
asset and home goods markets. The above two views of ERER emphasize 
adjustment in the internal and external sectors as the most immediate issue of 
concern.· From the foregoing qiscussion, it is clear that, modelling the 
2 
process of ERER determination is an issue of great concern to both academic 
and policy makers alike. This exercise, however, is rather nontrivial. As 
noted by Edwards (1987a), the ERER is not a fixed immutable number. The RER 
experiences two types of movements: short run disturbances around its 
equilibrium and long run movements between equilibrium points. The nature of 
ERER movement is determined by the path of immediate determinants of the ERER 
referred to as the ERER "fundamentals," Domowitz·and Elbadawi (1987b). Also, 
since the notion of equilibrium is "intertemporal" in nature, the path of the 
ERER will not only be affected by the current values of the fundamentals, but 
also by the expected future evolution of these variables, e.g. Edwards 
(1987a). 
More recently an important two sector model of tradables and nontradables 
due to Dornbusch (1974) has b~en extended by Sjaastad (1980) to a three sector 
model of exportables. importables, and home goods; this later model has 
subsequently been employed to study RER determination and intersectoral growth 
prospects with special emphasis on the agricultural sector. Authors such as 
Valdes (1985, 1986), Mundlak and Cavallo (1987), and Garcia (1981), used the 
rather strong evidence generated by the model to argue against RER 
overvaluation as a major factor retarding the growth of LDCs' agriculture. 
Since agriculture in most LDCs is the main comparative advantage of their 
economy, it is argued therefore, that LDCs that adopt policies leading to RER 
overvaluation will be pursuing an inoptimal growth path. The above studies 
which drew heavily from Latin American experience has been remarkably matched 
by equivalent evidence from Africa and Asia as in the work of Bautista (1985), 
Elbadawi (1987), Oyejide (1986), and Tshibaka (1986). 
The study of RER determination has traditionally been confined to the 
literature on pure trade, hence only.the real determinants of RER such as 
3 
terms of trade and commercial policies were considered. In the context of the 
small country assumption, analytical models of trade theory predicted real 
appreciation as a result of TOT improvement or restrictive trade policies, see 
for example Balassa (1982), Bacha and Taylor (1977) and Johnson (1966). More 
recent development in RER modelling included more general equilibrium models 
that tend to emphasize the importance of intermediate goods and the home 
goods' sector to RER determination. These recent models substantially 
qualified the clear-cut predictions of the traditional literature in 
international trade and economic liberalization. The impact on RER of TOT 
improvement or higher tariff rates can no longer be signed a priori, even 
though an RER appreciation may be more likely than RER depreciation; Edwards 
(1987a, 1987b), and Edwards and van Wijnbergen (1987). In addition to the 
long run real determinants of RER, impacts on RER of short run disequilibrium 
in the economy and the money market have also been explicitly addressed in 
recent models. The theoretical and empirical examples in this tradition 
include: Edwards (1985, 1986b, 1987a), Mundlak and Cavallo (1987), and 
Elbadawi (1987). 
In this paper we present a model of RER determinantion which accounts for 
the long run real determinants of RER as well as the short run disequilibrium 
influences on RER. The main contribution of this paper is that it explicitly 
models the impact on RER of the existence of a large black market for foreign 
exchange in the economy. The phenomenon of the black market for foreign 
exchange has been typical of many LDCs which are maintaining some forms of 
currency inconvertibility, while their domestic currencies were experiencing 
rapid depreciation. In the black market, domestic residents can acquire 
foreign exchange at a premium. Especially in the case of major 
labor-exporting countries where it may be difficult to control the supply of 
4 
foreign exchange to the black.market; the latter can be quite large and the 
black market dollars may end up being used to fipance current account 
2transactions. We will show that the black market premium can be a major 
source of RER appreciation. By solving for the premium as a function of the 
exogenous variables in the asset market, the model also provides some useful 
insight on the dynamic behavior of RER. In Section (2) of this paper the 
model is presented and the issues discussed in this section were developed in 
a more rigorous fashion. In Section (3) this model is applied to the case of 
the Sudan which is a major labor-exporting country, with an economy dominated 
by the exports of primary agricultural goods and imports of manufactures and 
intermediate goods. In the Sudan taxes on foreign trade is the main source of 
government revenue. The Sudanese economy has also been plagued by an 
expanding aggregate excess demand and a rather substantial black market for 
foreign exchange. In Section (4) we will use the econometric analysis of 
Section (3) to solve for the estimates of the structural parameters of the 
model and then the estimated ERER reduced form equation. Finally some 
concluding remarks follow in Section (5). 
2. The Model 
In this section a model of RER determination is developed. This model 
accounts for both the traditional long run real determinants such as the terms 
of trade and commercial policy. The model also incorporates the· short run 
disequilibrium effects of excess aggregate demand in the economy. Another 
attractive aspect of this model is that it explicitly considers the impact on 
RER when conditions of excess domestic demand for foreign exchange under 
currency inconvertibility give rise to the emergence of a black market for 
foreign exchange where domestic re£idents can acquire foreign currency at a 
5 
premium rate. 3 Also in this model, a discussion of the channels t;hrough which 
both the real and monetary factors may impinge on the RER and the extent to 
which they are interrelated is provided in some detail. 
The model is composed of four major building blocks. The first is 
concerned with the qefinition of RER and the price of tradable goods. In the 
second part of the model we derive a formula for the price of nontradables 
when equilibrium in the nontraded goods market is maintained. At this stage a 
semi-reduced form equation for RER can be derived. This equation will reflect 
the influences on RER of the terms of trade, commercial policy, the black 
market premium, and the impact of excess aggregate demand in the economy. In 
the last building block of the model we bring the conditions of the money and 
the asset markets into the picture. This will permit an explicit 
representation of the black market premium as a function of other exogenous 
determiants of RER. By substituting for the premium in the RER semi-reduced 
form equation and also by endogenizing the real income variable, we can 
ultimately obtain a full reduced form equation for RER that satisfies 
equilibrium in the home goods markets but may also be consistent with a 
potential disequilibrium in the asset market. 
(2.1) The RER and the Price of Tradables 
Let the (dollar) denominated international prices of exportables and 
importables be given by P* and P* respectively. By invoking the small country 
X Ill 
assumption, P* and P* can be considered as exogenous variables. Therefore for 
X m 
a given set of exchange rate and commercial policy, P and P , the domestic 
X m 
prices of exportables and.importables will be determined respectively by PX* 
and P* . Let e and e be respectively the official and the black market rates 
m 
of exchange where the exchange rate is given in terms of units of domestic 
6 
currency per unit of the foreign currency (dollar). Also let t be the net 
X 
export tax rate, and t be the net tax rate on imports which may also include 
m 
non-tariff implicit taxes such as quota rationing. The domestic prices of 
exportables and importables can.then be defined as in equations (1) and (2) 
below: 
p e(l-t )P* (1)
X X X 
{J-1-{J * p e e (l+t )P 0 < fJ < 1 (2)m m m 
The presence of the black market rate e in equation (2) reflects the 
increasing reliance on the black market dollars to finance some key import 
4categories in many LDCs. 
Letting the shares of exportables and importables in the tradable goods' 
sector be a and 1-a respectively, the domestic price of tradables, PT, is 
simply: 
0 < a < 1 (3) 
using (1) and (2) on (3) we obtain PT in the.following logarithmic form: 
log PT= loge+ (1-a)(l-{J)log q + a log(l-tx) 
+ (1-a)log(l+t) + a log P* 
m X 
+ (1-a)log P* (4)
m 
7 
and q = e/e is the black market premium. Equation (4) above shows PT' as 
expected, to depend on foreign prices, exchange rate and foreign trade p
olicy. 
But PT is also shown to depend on q the black market premium. The exten
t of 
the premium influence on PT will depend on the share of importables; 1-a
, in 
the tradable sector, and on the extent of black market's current account
 link, 
1-p. Finally, in this block we introduce the RER definition. The definition 
which we will use is that of the dependent economy type such as in Dornb
usch 
(1974, 1980) for example. 





(2.2) The Nontradables' Sector 
This part of the model draws on the literature which originated with the
 
work of Dornbusch (1974), and Sjaastad (1980) who extended the Dornbusch mod
el 
to three sectors, namely, exportables, importables, and home goods or 
The demand and supply functions for nontradables arenontradables. 











where real i.ncome y is used as a proxy for total expenditure in terms of home 
goods; f(·) is a measure of excess aggregate demand with f(O) = 0, and f' > O; 
and Gp is the productive capacity of the economy presumed to be determined by 
the existing domestic resources and technology. The exportables and 
importables' prices. P and P, are taken to be exogenous to the nontraded 
X m 
goods' market because they are determined by government foreign trade and 
exchange rate policy, and international market conditions. Also, the demand 
and supply homogeneity properties were exploited to represent the prices in 
relative terms. 
6
We now make a simplifying assumption by holding Gp fixed. Then we 
differentiate the above two equations logarithmically to obtain: 
/\ A A A A A A 
DN € (P - PN) + € (P - PN) + € y + €f f(·)X X m m y 
and 
A A A" " 
SN 'I (P - PN) + 'I (P - PN)X X m m 
where the hat(") over a variable denotes a proportionate change; and the €'s 
are the demand elasticities for home goods with respect to the exogenous 
variables; the 'l's are the corresponding supply elasticities. While the €'s 
are expected to be positive, the 'l's are expected to be negative. Assuming 
static equilibrium in the nontraded goods' market, we have: 
We can now obtain the following formula for PN which is the equilibrium 




w= 0 < w < 1
(€ -~) + (€ -~ )'· x x m m 
w w > 0 y y 
> 0
(€ -~) + (€ -~)
x x m m 
In order to have an explicit measure of excess aggregate demand, we 
A A A A 
assumed that f is equal to (DC - e - Y) which is the rate of growth in 
domestic credit in eicess of real growth in income or output plus the rate of 
official devaluation. This measure of excess aggregate demand emphasizes the 
importance of domestic credit expansion in ratifying excess aggregate demand. 
The measure also recognizes the sluggishness in real growth as a major factor 
7in accentuating excess aggregate demand. 
Using the above definition off(·), and equations (1) and (2) in (6) we 
obtain the following equation for PN in logarithmic form: 
w +loge+ (1-w)(l-fi)log q + w log(l-tx)0 
(7) 
10 
(2.3) Semi-Reduced Form Equations for RER 
Using equations (5) and (7) above we obtain a reduced form equation for 
RER (indexed over time) in equation (8) below: 
- w log y - w log[DC]y t f ey 
t 
(8)- (1-w)(l-P) log qt 
Now we will assume the following path for real income y similar to the one 
proposed by Edwards (1986b): 
* 
(9)log yt - g0+ g1t + g2log[::] 
m t 
that the rate of growth in real income y, is formed ofEquation (9) assumes 
components: a term of trade component and an independent term given by gttwo 
which is set equal to g t for simplicity.1 
Using (9) in equation (8) above we obtain another semi-reduced form 
equation for RER: 
11 
* 
-w log(l-tx) t - [(w-a) + g2(wy-wf)] log[::] 
m t 
(10) 
Equations (8) and (10) above are semi-reduced form equations because the 
potentially endogenizable variables y and q were treated as exogenous in (8), 
while q was taken to be exogenous in (10). Equation (8) is confined to the 
first round effects of the determinants of RER. For example the first round 
effects of commercial policy is given by the coefficients of log(l-t) and 
X 
log(I+t ). According to equation (8) a decrease in export or import taxes . m 
will cause an RER depreciation. The extent of such depreciation will depend 
on the respective relative elasticities, w, and 1-w, of the price of 
exportables and importables in the home goods market. This clear cut result 
is generated by our model because we assumed that the substitution effects 
between tradables and nontradables (wand 1-w) dominate any potential income 
effect due to commercial policy. Especially for the case of importables, it 
is argued that if initially there was a large tariff in place, the reduction 
in tariffs may increase welfare and the demand for nontradables, thus leading 
to an upward pressure in their prices, Edwards (1987b). Should this income 
effect dominate, we may have an RER appreciation rather than depreciation as a 
result of tariff liberalization; contrary to what is predicted by our model. 
The model, however, can easily be extended to accommodate for this channel by 
adding the term log(l+t) to the right hand side of equation (9) above. 
m 
Equation (8) also depicts the first round effects on RER due to 
expenditure, aggregate excess demand and the premium. An increase in 
12 
expenditure or in aggregate excess demand will cause the price of nontradables 
(equation (7)) to rise, thus leading to an RER appreciation. The extent of 
this appreciation is given by the respective elasticities wy and wf. A rise 
in the black market premium is also predicted to cause an RER appreciation. 
The extent of the premium effect will depend, however, on both_the elasticity 
due to the price of importables in home goods market (1-w), as well as the 
share of imports financed through the black market, 1-p. 
Finally for the case of terms of trade, equation (8) predicts that a TOT 
improvement cannot cause an RER appreciation, as predicted by the classical 
theory of real trade; only if the exportables price elasticity, w, exceeds the 
share of exportables in the tradable goods group can an RER appreciation take 
place. This implies that the effect on RER due to TOT is not a priori 
determined even when we confine ourselves to the first round effects as in 
equation (8) above. The picture for the TOT effects will be even more 
ambiguous in the context of equation (10) when the second round effects were 
brought into the picture. Tqese TOT second round effects were provided by two 
opposing channels. A TOT improvement will lead through (9) to an increase ~n 
real income and a consequent rise in PN (equation (7)) thus leading to an RER 
appreciation of magnitude g wy; a rise in real income (output) on the other2 
hand, will lead to a declining aggregate excess demand, causing a decline in 
PN and ultimately an RER depreciation of magnitude, g wf. This aspect of the2 
model is quite attractive since it accommodates the recent theoretical results 
in the literature of RER determination, Edwards and van Wijnbergen (1986a). 
2.4 The Monetary and Asset Markets 










Equation (11) is the money supply identity, where Mis the stock of money, DC 
is domestic credit, and R is the official foreign reserves which is 
denominated in the foreign currency. Equation (12) depicts the domestic 
currency denominated stock of official reserve relative to the domestic value 
of private holdings of foreign money, as a function of the foreign TOT and the 
equilibriwn conditions in the asset market. The potential positive impact on 
reserves as a result of TOT improvement is obvious. The inclusion of the 
other term in equation (12) provides a direct link between the asset market 
and the foreign balance. Subsequently this will generate very interesting 
channels in the ultimate RER reduced form equation. This idea was used by 
Edwards (1985, 1987a) where the equilibrium condition in the money market was 
the black marketintroduced in a similar fashion. In our case, however, where 
for foreign exchange is an important phenomenon, and the choice between the 
two currencies is important, the asset market equilibrium condition is more 
14 
relevent. Equation (13) describes the demand for domestic money relative to 
foreign money. the effect of real income is expected to be positive; while 
"e 
the effect of e , the opportunity cost of holding domestic money relative to 
the foreign money, is expected to be negative. The opportunity cost of 
holding domestic money is given by the expected rate of depreciation of the 
black market rate, and expectations are assumed to be rational as in (14a) 
above. Expectations of official devaluation is also assumed to be rational as 
in (14b). 
From equations (14a) and (14b) it follows that: 
" e 
et= Et log qt+l - log qt+ Et (15) 
From equations (11)-(13) we can derive the following equation for relative 
money supply: 
Ml Oz (1-m)ao m 
log-~r = l+O_(l-m) + 1+0 (1-m,)
le.rJ z · · 0"" t 
01 (1-m) 
* 




2 2+ log yt1 + 0 (1-m)2 









(2.5) The RER Reduced Form and the Working of the Model 
Using equations (9) and (15) on (16) above we can obtain the following 
martingale structure: 
(17) 
-70 - 73go m - 71 
h =-----+-----







Using the method of undetermined coefficients a particular forward solution of 
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In the event that asset market equilibrium is imposed or the impact of asset 
market disequilibrium on reserves is deemed to be insignificant, the following 





Equation (21) describes the rational expectation equilibrium in the asset 
market, while equation (20) is consistent with disequilibrium in the asset 
market. Both of the two equations are important equations in their own right 
in the context of the asset market approach to the black market for foreign 
T--."Y"nr-n~+- ...,,.......-,,1 ... .,.,..;,.. ...,_.,..,.More importantly to our _p.1..1....-,oV.L.l\..- C.U. .lCI..LJ.::,.L;;:,' 0.11Y 
of the above two equations permits in a natural way, the incorporation of the 
dynamic aspects of RER determination. By using (19) and (20) in (10) we 
obtain the ultimate dynamic reduced form RER.equation in (22) below. Should 
we use (21) instead of (20), the solution will be a special case of (22) where 
the resulting RER solution will be consistent with equilibriums in both the 




Besides showing the current impacts on RER of its exogenous determinants as in 
equation (10) above; equation (22) which satisfies equilibrium in the 
nontraded goods market, also.includes the impact on RER of the expected 
behavior of its determinants. The channel through which expectation about the 
exogenous variables impinges on RER is the black market premium. The impact 
on RER of a given Eh . will therefore depend crucially on the size of thet t+J 
black market, 1-~; and the extent of the imported goods' intensity of the home 
goods, 1-w. The magnitude of the innovation Eh . itself will depend of 
t t+J 
course on the relative changes among the exogenous variables as well as the 
elasticities pertaining to the asset market, the foreign reserve equation, and 
the money market identity. Etht+j will lead to an RER appreciation through 
three determinants. The first is given through an expectation of higher level 
of domestic credit relative to the private holding of foreign money 
denominated in domestic currency using the official exchange rate, 
18 
log[n~] ; this clearly shows the importance of unchecked domestic credit 
e t+j 
expansion in accentuating RER appreciation. Thus, besides its current impact 
on RER through the aggregate excess demand, the current and expected levels of 
DC may also cause further RER appreciation through the ~remiurn channel. The 
second effect that may cause an RER appreciation is the expected level of 
official reserves relative to the private holding of foreign money, 
Etlog[;) . In cases when the economy is characterized by a structurally 
t+j . 
weak currency and a relatively large black market for foreign exchange, R may 
in fact be very small relative to F. The impact of Etlog[_i_j on RER 
t+j 
therefore, may, in fact, ameliorate the appreci.ationary effect due to domestic 
credit expansion. Finally, expectations of accelerated rates of official 
devaluation will also cause RER appreciation. This result has very important 
implications for the debate related to the effectiveness of nominal exchange 
rate devaluation as a tool of economic stabilization and export promotion, 
when the economic environment is dominated by speculative behavior and 
expectations. The final term in Etht+j of interest to our discussion is 
* 
Etlog[:~]- An expected improvement in the terms of trade will unambiguously 
lead to an RER depreciation. Within the black market channel, the expected 
TOT will operate through two further sub-channels. The first is the effect of 
income in the demand for money and the other is the direct effect of TOT on 
foreign reserves. 
19 
' 3. An Application to the Sudan 
(3.1) The Sudan's RER and Its Determinants: A Preliminary Analysis 
In this section we will apply the above model to analyze the determinants 
of the Sudanese RER. The Sudan economy provides an interesting case study to 
discuss the type of issues considered jn the model of Section (2). The 
mainstay of the Sudan economy is provtded by its agricultural sector which 
provides for more than 90% of total foreign exchange earnings out of exports. 
The domestic industry and a significant portion of the agricultural sector, on 
the other hand, depend heavily on imported capital and intermediate goods. 
Despite an increasing share for the nontradable service sector in the GDP, the 
Sudanese economy remains highly tradable with the combined share of 
agriculture and industry in GDP in excess of 50%. Figure (1) depicts two 
alternative definitions of the Sudan RER. Another view of the Sudan's RER and 
its potential determinants is provided by Table (1) and (2). One such 
determinant is TOT which has been averaging more than 90% except for the years 
1975 and 1979 which came immediately ater two major oil price hikes. The 
Sudan's economy has also been characterized by an extensive system of import 
restrictions and fixed multiple exchange rates. This type of regime which is 
generally considered typical of most LDCs, is presumed to have its 
intellectual motivation in a development doctrine bent on "Industrial Import 
Substitution" as the main strategy. In the case of the Sudan, however, other 
goals such as balance of payment, and government revenue considerations, 
encouragement of remittances from Sudanese nationals working abroad (SNWA) 
and to some extent export promotion,·. seem to be the key factors shaping the 
Sudan's foreign trade and payment regime, Elbadawi (1987). As the Sudanese 
economy started to assume crisis proportions by the mid seventies and the 
domestic and foreign balances continued to worsen, the need to check excess 
9 
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aggregate demand and to maintain government revenues ensures the maintenance 
of the above system. The attempted foreign trade liberalization that came 
with an IMF-inspired package could not, therefore, be sustained. The figures 
on Table (1) attest to the above description. 
Also, as can be seen from Table t2), the turbulant developments in the 
Sudanese macroeconomic science after the mid seventies have included massive 
monetary expansion with the money supply (M
1
) and domestic credit growing, 
respectively, at an average annual rate of 27%, and 26% during 1975-1986. The 
official reserves which have been stagnant or at times growing at a negative 
rate has only partially moderated the overall growth rate in the money supply, 
see Table (2). The combination of monetary expansion and highly anticipated 
maxi-devaluations has accelerated domestic inflation which rose from a single 
digit by 1972/73 to more than 37% by 1985. 
10 
Such conditions of inflationary 
environment and highly suppressed aggregate demand, especially the one for 
imported goods, have paved the way for the emergence and subsequent expansion 
of the black market for foreign exchange. In recognition of the increasing 
importance of SNWA remittances as a source of much needed foreign exchange, 
the authorities have introduced a premium exchange rate for SNWA remittances 
and a new import system, the 'nil-value' system. These two measures were 
designed to encourage the transfer of remittances through the regular banking 
system and the use of SNWA savings to finance imports to the country. The 
offical exchange rate, however, could not keep pace with the black market 
rate, see Table (l); and therefore the lion share of SNWA remittances were 
channeled through the black market. On the other hand, the 'nil-value' system 
of imports - being largely financed by black market dollars - were turned into 
a current account link for the black market. For example by 1980 about 60% of 
total imports were financed through the black market, Hussain (1986). Due to 
Figure ( 1) 
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*See footnote of Table (1) for the definitions 
of REER and RERUS 
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Table 1 
The Sudan's Real Exchange Rates and· Its Determinants 
Black Market 
'r'ear REER RERUS TOT --1.L _l.1L Premium 
1970 76.2 108.4 98.0 .052 .658 1 • 200 
1971 81.9 107.7 85.3 .057 .663 1.200 
1972 75. 1 103.6 87.3 .059 ,627 1. 200 
1973 78.3 152.8 83.3 . 057 .530 1.200 
1974 88.9 139.4 89.2 .066 .564 1. 200 
1975 74.3 94.8 69.6 .095 .443 1.20(1 
1976 76.3 96. 1 89.2 .089 .515 1.333 
1977 74.8 82.2 98.0~- - • 098 .815 1.833 i978 70.6 74.7 O..), ,2'1 .094 . 649 2.233 
1979 70.B 82.8 77.5 .074 .59B 2.286 
1980 100.0 100. 0 100.0 • 105 .521 1.740 
1981 92.2 86.3 88.2 • 172 .551 1.862 
1982 100. 1 84.5 98.0 .066 .218 1.800 
1983 104.7 102.8 94. 1 • 012 .219 1. 616 
1984 79.8 83.4 93.4 .028 .621 1. 877 
1985 86.6 72.8 96.9 .013 .679 2.579 
1986 72.1 59.7 .680 2.381 
Note: The real effective exchange rate CREER) was cbmputed as: a weighted sum 
of the exchange rates multipiied by WPI's for Sudan's major trading partners, 
divided by the Sudan's CPI. fhe CPI, the only price series available for the 
Sudan, is used as a proxy for the price of nontradables, see Elbadawi (i987) for 
discussion on this. The partner£:. \and weights) are: Egypt (.03); Saudi Arabia 
and rest of the Middle East (.32), USA i.06) 1 West Germany (.11), France (.06), 
UK (.12). Italy (.10), In'dia (.1)6), Japan (.09), Romania (0.0ll, Yugosl.avia 
1.04). The RERUS index is obtained by multiplying the bilateral Sudan-US 
exchange rate with the World Price Index for Manufactures and dividing by the 
Sudanese CPI. An increase in any of the two RER indices reflects real 
depreciation wherea5 a d2crPase in RER is appreciation. The black market 
premium is obtained as a ratio of the black market rate to the official rate. 
Sources: The data on prices, exchange rates and taxes are obtained from IFS 
and El badawi ! 1987). 
Table (2) 
Rates of Change in Some of Sudan's Key Macroeconomic Indicators (X) 
Deipreciation in 
the BlackMoney Official 
Supply Reserves Domestic INF Real Official Market Real Depreciation 
Year ( M 1) ($) Credit CC~CP I) GDP Devaluation R~.te REER RERUS 
.,. C'1:,. 6 1.2 ...,. ,_, 00.0 00.0 7. 1 -0.61971 6.8 25, 1 
-3.91972 15.4 24. 1 18. 1 7.9 9.6 00.0 00.0 8.6 
00. 0 4. 1 38.91973 19.6 54.6 11. 1 14.6 3.0 00. 0 
1974 30.1 70.7 26. 1 21.6 11. 3 00.0 00.0 12.7 -9.2 
1975 17. 1 -122.8 46. 1 19. 1 0,2 oo.o 00.0 -18.0 -38.5 
1976 21. 9 -43.3 24.8 2.0 18.2 00.0 10.5 2.6 1.3 
1977 35,(1 -2. 1 27.5 16. 1 7.5 oo.o 31.8 -2.0 -15.5 
1978 24.3 20.6 21.5 18.2 2.5 00. 0 19.7 -5.8 -9.6 
1979 27.8 86.4 20.5 29.0 -16.7 15.4 17.7 0.3 10.3 
-c- -1980 27. 1 -32.5 19.6 24.2 -5.9 .) ;,;i • I 8.4 34;5 18.9 
1981 --,)~ .-..:., -105.2 29,6 12.4 5.9 14.8 21.6 -8. 1 -14.7 
6 'J 32.2 28. B· 8.3 -2. 1• .L.1982 31.2 18.7 14.9 31.9 
1983 11. 1 -21.1 25.8 27.6 -.) • 0' 40 .. 5 29.8 4.4 19.6 
17.B 26.8 -7.9 8.0 22.9 -27.1 -20.91984 16.8 ~'. 0 
1985 40.5 -34.3 31.1 22.2 -1. 7 37.9 69.7 8. 1 -13.6 
- C' r:;1986 36. 1 156.8 31.6 ..) iJ. iJ 4. 1 10.0 2.0 -18.2 -19.8 




the existence of such a large black market for foreign exchange, the black 
market premium can be a major factor causing RE& appreciation. 
(3.2) The Econometric Model 
In this sub-section we will conduct an econometric analysis of RER in the 
Sudan based on the model of Section (2) above. Sufficies to estimate 
equations (9), (10), (12), (13), and (16) in order to identify the structural 
parameters of the model. Variants of the above equations were estimated using 
annual Sudanese data for the period 1970-1987. The regressions' results are 
reported in the following equations: 
,., * 
log yt = -.01 TREND+ .46 + 1. 25 log[p:] 
(.005) (.17) (.09) pm t-1 
* 
+ 0.56 [log yt-l - log[p:] ] 
(.l 6 ) · pm t-1 
0. 52 · , DW 1.54 , Q(7) = 6.96 (9') 
,., 
log RERt 4.51 + 0.01 TREND -0.91 1:,. log[~c]t 
(.007) (.14) 
1-t ]log __x -- 1.25 1. 35 log(l+t)l+t[ m t( .42) Ill t ( .43) 
25 
+ 0 .13 log[P:]* [log RERt-l - log[~c] - log qt- ll+ 0 .18 
(. 20) P (.04) t-1 
m t 
R2 = 0.94, DW = 2.19, Q(7) = 10.99 (10') 
" " 
- .87 +0.098 [log[~d] - log[~eF] ]
(0.116) eF t t 
(P*__) 
+ 0.31 t:. + 1.15 logl :J 
(0.50 (. 79 ) Pmt-1 
+ O. 94 [log[ ~R] - log[p;] ](.ll) eF t-1 t-1pm 
2R = 0.96 , DW = 2.03 , Q(7) = 6.83 (12') 
" 
log[~e1F] = [loge l - loge l + 0.23 logy - 0.43 D-1.96 
(.620) t+ t (.023 t (.25)
t 
2R = 0.46 , DW = 1.83 , Q(7) 3.08 (13') 
" 
0.84 t:. log[~cJ log[~cJ +.06 log[P:] * +O. 75 
(.056) eF t (.11) eF t-l (.034) P lmt-
+ 0. 5 7 [1og [~ ] _log[~cJ ]
(.24) eF l · eF t- t-1 
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2
R - 0.98 , DW ~ 2.5 , Q(7) ~ 8.6 (16') 
The estimation technique used is OLS and standard errors are in 
parantheses. Q(7) is the Box-Pierce statistics for residual autocorrelation 
to 7th order. The RER variable used in the econometric model is the REER as 
defined in the footnote of Table (1). Dis a dummy variable for the post 1984 
drought period which witnessed an even higher accelerated monetary expansion. 
The data on eF, the domestic currency denominated value of foreign currency 
held by the private sector, is proxied by the estimate of the income 
11circulated in the black market. Other variables in the above equations are 
defined as in Section (2) above. The above regression results may of course 
be subject to criticism perhaps due to the relatively shor't range of the 
estimation, or the not so high quality of the Sudanese data on eF and y, see 
the data appendix for more details on this. Not withstanding the above 
criticism, no evidence of serious misspecification, however, can be detected. 
Also virtually all the elasticity estimates are statistically significant, and 
all of them are consistent with the theoretical model. 
The variables involved in the above cited equations were found to be 
12co-integrating; tis suggests t h use of an . de1 to 
. h . 13 
· · h" e error-correction mo 
estimate t e equations. Our error-correc~ion estimating equations are 
consistent with a one period error-correction loss function similar to the one 
14employed in Domowitz and Elbadawi (1987), and Elbadawi (1984). The error 
correction, besides being a generalization to the partial adjustment type 
models, is advantageous in at least two counts. It provides a more general 
lag structure that does not impose too specific a shape on the model, Hendry 
(1980a). It also avoids the fundamental 'spurious' regression problem of 
Granger and Newbold (1974). 
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It provides theEquation (10') is the hallmark of the above system. 
elasticity estimates of the first and second order determinants 
of RER. The 
equation reveals strong evidence on the impact on RER of excess 
aggregate 
demand, log[~cJ, with short run elasticity at -0.91 and long-run im
pact 
elasticity at -0.18. While the premium, log q, does not have an
 impact in the 
short-run, it does have a significant long-run impact elasticity
. Therefore, 
as expected for the Sudanese economy, excess aggregate demand an
d the black 
market premium can be major sources of real exchange rate appre
ciation. As we 
mentioned in Section (2), the impact on RER of the later determ
inant depends 
crucially on the import intensity of the home goods and the size
 of the black 
market, which are both quite substantial, see Section (3.1) abo
ve. The above 
equation also shows significant influence on RER for commercial 
policy. The 
elasticity estimates due to commercial policy were obtained sub
ject to the 
parameteric restrictions of equation (10). The elasticity due 
to export 
taxes, log (1-tx) is given b! -1.25, while that due to tariffs a
nd other 
To the extent that thisimplicit import taxes, log(l+t) is given by -0.10.m 
result is robust, this finding has very important implications f
or the future 
It is
direction of foreign trade and public finance policies in the S
udan. 
clear that Sudanese exports cannot remain competitive if it sho
uld sustain net 
foreign trade taxes. Import taxes on the other hand, were show
n to be a less 
important factor in causing RER appreciation; thus suggesting th
at the cost in 
terms of export competitiveness may not be high as a result of t
axing imports, 
especially final consumer goods. The positive impact on RER of
 the trend 
factor shows that the influence of income through the excess ag
gregate demand 
channel dominates its influence through the expenditure channel
. Finally the 
impact on RER due to TOT is also positive, thus a TOT improveme
nt will improve 
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the competitiveness of the economy. The effect due to TOT which encompasses 
the income, excess demand, and direct channels is not found to be 
statistically significant, however. The structural parameters of equation 
(10) of Section (2) above are consistent with long run equilibrium in the 
nontradable sector, .the estimates of these parameters are obtained from (10) 
by setting~ log xt = 0, and log x 1 ·
= log x for any variable x and then 
t- t 
solving for log RERt to obtain: 
A 





Note that the presence of the term log rDCl in equation (10") implies thatle J - -
aggregate excess demand in the economy is allowed to persist in the long-run. 
Secondly, we consider equation (9') which shows the TOT as having a 
significant impact on real income both in the short run and the long run with 
impact elasticity given by 0.46 and 1.25 respectively, the error correction 
term effect is also quite significant at 0.56. Real income in Sudan is also 
shown, as expected, to experience a declining trend with an annual percentage 
decline of 1%. The long run equilibrium equation consistent with (9') is 
. . [p:1
obtained analogously by setting~ log p~t = 0, 
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logy and solving for logy to obtain:1t- ' t 
*A 
(9")- - .02 TREND + 1.57 log[:~ t 
Equation (12') als.o shows an important role for TOT as a determinant of 
official reserves accumulation relative to private holding of foreign money. 
This result is fairly consistent with the stylized facts of the Sudanese 
economy being highly dependent on the exports of primary agricultural goods 
and the imports of intermediate and manufactured goods. The equation, 
however, shows a rather insignificant impact for disequilibrium in the asset 
market. One explanation for this result is that the use of annual data in the 
estimation may have caused the model to fail to pick the essentially short run 
effect of the asset market disequilibrium. Another explanation is that the 
asset market may in fact be in equilibrium since the black market premium can 
move freely to ensure that. 
The e~pl ~n,qt-i nnc: of the above res1..1lt be as they may be, based on the 
findings of equation (12') we impose a zero coefficient for the term due to 
the disequilibrium in the asset market and we therefore rewrite equation (12) 
of Section (2) as: 
Substituting the above equation in the monetary identity (11) of Section (2) 
we obtain a money supply equation which is equivalent to equation (16) of 
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Section (2) when equilibrium in the asset market is imposed. The 
corresponding regression estimates are provided in (16'). 
The implications of the above are that the resulting long run black 
market premium will be consistent with equilibrium in the asset market as in 
also the ultimate RER solution will be consistentequation (21) of the model, 
with equilibriums in both of the asset and home goods markets. In equation 
(16') above, the supply of domestic money relative to foreign money is shown 
to be accounted for by domestic credit expansion and TOT. While both of the 
two factors ha~e significant long-run impacts on relative money supplies, only 
domestic credit has a significant short run effect. Also, as expected, the 
direct impacts on!:!_ due to domestic credit expansion is much higher than the 
eF 
channeled through the official reserves. The equationindirect effects of TOT 
analogous to (16') describing the equilibrium determinants of the relative 
money supply is given in (16") below. 
A 
(16")log.[;;L + log0.42 0.13 
Finally we consider the relative demand for money equation, which is the 
only equation in the system estimated directly, see footnote (13). The 
reflect a·strongestimates of the equation which are reported in (13') 
influence on relative money demand due to exchange rate expectations; the 
impact due to real income is also statistically significant albeit much 
smaller in absolute value. 
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4. The Equilibrium Premium and Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate in the Sudan 
By equating the right hand sides -of equations (13') and (16") of the 
above section we can solve for the black market premium, log qt,* which is 
consistent with equilibrium in the asset market. The formula for log qt* is 
"* provided in equatio~ (21) of Section (2), and its estimate log qt is given in 
equation (21') below: 
00 ( ]j
(1. 96 + .42) -l 1.% Eh (21')I ll.96+.42 t t+jj=O 
and 
+ 1.96 log[e1:1) - (0.23)(-.02)TREND 
Equation (21') above provides a very useful insight of the equilibrium 
has been consistently in excess of one despite repeated official exchange rate 
devaluations. As can be seen from the expression of h above, credit expansion 
and expectation of future devaluation are key factors behind the observed 
behavior of the premium. The effect of TOT on the premium works through two 
channels: the one through reserves is given by 0 (1-m) = (.22)(.58) which has1 
a positive effect on log q* , the other has a negative effect on log q* and 
works through the income channel in the relative demand for money and is given 
by: ( . 2 3) (1. 57) . The net·effect on log q* is -.23 which tends to ameliorate 
the positive effects on q due to domestic credit expansion and speculative 
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environment. This TOT counter effect is relatively small being of only second 
order as compared to the other two first order; this finding, however, which 
reflects the importance of external factors may have important qualitative 
implications for domestic stabilization policy, see Elbadawi (1988d). Finally 
the effect due to TREND which can be construed as.aproxy for technological 
progress or growth in real output (or income) due to non-price factors. Since 
the real growth in output has been small and negative in the Sudan, the 
effectof TREND on log q* is small yet positive. Once again this result 
demonstrates the potential payoffs in terms of economic stabilization that can 
be generated from investment in aggregate output supply. The ultimate impact 
of Eh . on log q*t will be discounted by (.42)(.82)j. If we assume specifict t+J 
time series structures for the elements of h . we can obtain the full effectt+J 
of Eh . on log qt'* we do this by assuming the following time seriest t+J 
processes: 
(21.1') 
log Ft+j log F . l + . (21.2')t+J- E 2 ,t+J 
log DCt+j = log DC . l + µ + E 3, t+j (21.3')·t+J - ' 
+ f (21.4')log[::]* -log[:~ 
* 
. 4, t+j 
m t+j t+j-1 
where the e's are white noise disturbances. Equation (21.2') and (21.4') 
state that each of TOT and stock of foreign money held by domestic residents 
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follows a random walk. According to equations (21.1') and (21.3') on the 
other hand, the official exchange rate is expected to experience a constant 
devaluatio~ rate¢, while the expected gro'wth rate in domestic credit isµ. 
Now using (21.1') - (21.4') on (21') we obtain the. following operational 
"* equation for log qt: 
+ 17.11 ¢ + 0.01 TREND+ 0.05 (21") 
Finally we use equation (21") in the semi reduced form equation for log RER 
t 
given in (10") above to obtain the estimate of log RERt* the equilibrium RER 
(ERER). The results are provided in Table (3) below: 
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Table (3) 
The Determinants of ERER in the Sudan 
Channel 
Direct Income Excess A~gregate Demand Black Market Total 
Determinant 
0.12 .28(.12)( 2) 
log(l-t) -1. 52 -1.52 
X 
log(l+t) - .12 -.12 
m 
-.22 -.22 - .44 
log Ft +.22 +.22 
-1.03 -1.03 
-3.76 -3.76 
TREND 0.01 -.002 .098 
(1) Due to income, excess aggregate demand as well as the direct influence 
on tradables and nontradables. 
(2) Since the direct effect due to TOT is not statistically significant, we 
might as well consider only TOT effect through the black market. 
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The results of Table (3) confirm our view that: in the Sudan the black 
market for foreign exchange can be a major channel of real exchange rate 
appreciation. Through the black market, the dollar denominated stock of 
domestic credit, a strong appreciationary effect on RER with an[~ct, has 
sameelasticity equal to -.22; [~C)t also exerts another effect on RER of the 
order of magnitude through the direct channel ·of excess aggregate demand. The 
total effect of the initial or current stock of domestic credit [~C)t is 
therefore given by an elasticity of -.44. The other major cause of RER 
r~teappreciation channeled through the black market is the of growth of 
domestic credit, µ, with an elasticity of -1.03. In addition to the above 
causes of RER appreciation which were channeled through the black market, 
expectation of future devaluations stands to be recognized as the most 
important with an elasticity of -3.76. These factors and especially the last 
one, can explain a lot about the observed ineffectiveness of official nominal 
devaluation in bringing about reasonable levels of RER depreciation. Betweeen 
1979 which marked the beginning of the major maxi-devaluations in the Sudan 
and 1987 the year of the last devaluation; the average annual rate of 
devaluation was 26% while the RER depreciated.at a meager annual rate of 4%. 
in F, the stockStill operating through the black market channel, a decrease 
of foreign money privately held; will cause an RER appreci~tion with an 
This finding has very important policy impU.cations forelasticity of O. 22. 
the Sudan. The recent trade policies in the Sudan aimed at utilizing black 
market dollars to finance imports, can be quite costly in terms of 
Such policy will first lead to enhancing thecompetitiveness of the economy. 
importance of the black market channel by increasing the factor, 1-fi, which is 
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the share of imports financed through the black market. This policy will also 
upset the asset market equilibrium by reducing the stock, F, thus leading to 
RER appreciation. 
The other determinants of RER have already been discussed in the previous 
section, hence a summary statement is in order. The effect on RER due to 
commercial policy is consistent with prior expectation in that foreign trade 
taxes on exports or imports can lead to RER ap_pr·eciation. The impact due to 
export taxes, however, is much stronger than that of import taxes. TOT 
improvement on the other hand, is shown to cause RER depreciation. This 
implies that just like domestic policy mistakes, adverse external factors can 
lead to deteriorating competitiveness in the Sudanese economy as well. And 
finally, if we identify the trend effect; though minimal, with productivity 
growth, the investment in output supply is shown to lead to enhanced 
competitiveness in the economy; this is of course a fairly classical result. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The real exchange rate is increasingly recognized as the main policy 
variable in the academic and policy discussions in a wide range of issues such 
as indebtedness, stabilization, growth, food security and the role of 
agriculture in LDCs. RER misalignment, and .especially overvaluation with 
respect to its equilibrium, is presumed to be a major impediment to achieving 
the above policy goals which are the hallmark of any potential economic 
achievement of a developing country. As such, therefore, modelling of RER 
behavior is a top priority in the research agenda from both the academic and 
policy oriented perspectives. Especially emphasized in this connection is the 
ability to develop models that permit distinction between the long run 
equilibrium behavior of RER and its short run disequilibrium dynamics. 
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In this paper I presented a model that addresses the above concerns. The 
model permits long run equilibrium movements in -RER to be distinguished from 
the short run disequilibrium movements of the RER. An important aspect of the 
model is that it explicitly considers the black market premium as one of the 
fundamental determinants of RER. Especially in economies plagued with 
persistent excess aggregate demand, and rapidly depreciating domestic money 
under a regime characterized with currency inconvertibility and highly 
regulated current account transactions, the black market is usually a 
persistent and a growing part of the economy. The rational expectation 
solution of the equilibrium black market premium which reflects the 
equilibrium in the asset market allows for dynamic determinants of RER to be 
incorporated naturally in the ultimate ERER representation. This model is 
then applied to the case of the Sudan, an LDC which approximates the economic 
environment described above. 
The findings confirm other evidence on the impact on RER of commercial 
policy. It is found that dependence on foreign trade taxes as the main source 
of government revenue may be costly in terms of the competitiveness of the 
Sudanese economy. The evidence, however, is much stronger for the case of 
export taxes than for import taxes. The TOT effect is such that a worsening 
in the TOT will lead to an RER appreciation rather than depreciation. This 
result is consistent with the structure of the Sudanese economy where the 
prime comparative advantage is provided by the export-oriented agricultural 
sector, especially the traditional subsector with its low intensity of 
imported inputs. The evidence also reflects an important effect on RER of 
domestic monetary expansion, it can cause both short-run and long-run RER 
appreciation. Domestic credit growth operates on RER through two channels: a 
direct one through the excess,.aggregate demand and the indirect channel of the 
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black market premium. The premium is an important channel which in addition 
to the above determinant also allows expectations about future devaluation to 
impinge quite significantly on RERE in the Sudan. Expectation of future 
devaluation is shown to be a major factor causing RER appreciation. This 
finding can at least partially explain·the observed empirical regularity 
regarding the ineffectiveness of official devaluations in influencing real 
variables in a positive way in highly speculative environments such as the one 
in the Sudan. Finally the evidence also showed that a reduction in the stock 
of foreign currency privately held will lead to an RER appreciation. One 
implication of this finding is that any policy that leads to an enhanced 
current account role for the black market such as the 'nil' value system of 
imports in the Sudan, 
16 can be presumed to have deleterious effects on the 
competitiveness of the economy. 
In LDCs there is in general no distinction between monetary and fiscal 
policy. Strictly speaking, domestic credit expansion is basically determined 
by the fiscal deficit. This paper, however, did not consider such dependency. 
Endogenizing domestic credit, therefore, is an interesting extension to this 
work in the future. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
A.l Foreign Trade Taxes 
Data on import and export taxes were obtained from Elbadawi (1987). The 
export tax rate was calculated as a weighted average of the individual tax 
rates for six of Sudan's major agricultural exports. The import tax on the 
other hand, accounts for the implicit effect due to QRs in addition to the 
average tariff rate, see Elbadawi (1987) for more detail. 
A.2 Exchange Rates and Prices 
Data on exchange rates and prices for the Sudan and its trading partners 
are obtained from the IFS. The price data for the Sudan is the CPI, the only 
price available for the entire period. The prices of the Sudan's trading 
partners are WPis. The black market exchange rate data on the Sudan is 
obtained from Elbadawi (1987), and World Currency Yearbook. 
A.3 Income 
The income variable used in this study is the Sudanese GDP series, which 
is based on the national -income accounts. There are some well known problems 
with such series. Such problems are due to changes in methodology used to 
assemble the accounting data, and to potentially large errors in the survey 
data. Nevertheless, these are the best income data available at this time, 
and are obtained from line 99b of the IFS and the·Bank Al-Sudan reports. 
The data on eF, the domestic currency denominated privately held stock of 
foreign money is proxied by the estimate of income circulating in the black 
market, see text and footnote (11) for more details. 
, 
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A.4 Monetary Variables 
This includes money, domestic credit, and official reserves. The data on 
all of the above variables is obtained from IFS. The definition of money 
taken in the study is the narrow one (Ml). 
A.5 Terms of Trade 
The data on TOT is obtained from The World Bank (1982, 1985) and the last 





1. Strictly speaking most of the above cited literature did not solve 
explicitly for exports, employment, or output, as functions of real 
exchange rate; -the structure developed, however, can easily be adapted to 
do that. 
2. In case~ where substantial foreign exchange is channeled through the 
black market, the authorities may attempt to utilize those resources by 
initiating an import system, for example, where the use of the black 
.market foreign exchange by importers to finance such imports though 
illegal in theory but nevertheless a common practice. For a discussion 
of the case of the Sudan on this issue see Umbadda (1984, 1986). 
3. Examples of the literature in the black market for foreign exchange 
include: Blejer (1978), Culbertson (1975), Levy (1983), Dornbusch et. 
al. (1983), de Macedo (1983), Ali and Hussain (1986), Elbadawi (1988a), 
and Elbadawi and Hussain (1988). 
4. See Footnote (2) above. 
5. Edwards (1987) provides an interesting discussion on several real 
exchange rate definitions. 
6. This assumption is j-ust:ified on the account that productive capacity in 
LDCs tend to change over a much longer horizon than do relative prices 
and other demand variables. 
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7. In Edwards (1985, 1986b), f(·) is set equal to (~t-~~). This measure of 
excess aggregate demand recognizes the foreign reserves channel as a 
source of monetary disequilibrium in addition to domestic credit. The 
environment of interest to us in this paper, however, is one where 
monetary disequilibrium is dominated by move~ents in domestic credit. 
8. See Pesaran (1987), for a useful and comprehensive discussion of rational 
expectation models such as the one in equation (17). 
9. Currently these remittance flows are estimated at $3 billion annually, 
which is almost three times the foreign exchange earnings out of exports. 
10. Unofficial, and possibly more reliable, estimates of inflation in the 
Sudan put the figure at a range of 50 to 60 percent. 
11. Income circulating in the black market was estimated in Hussain and 
Elbadawi (1988) by using the identity MV = Y where Mis money supply, V 
is the velocity of money, and Y is nominal income. The unreported black 
market income, Y, is then obtained as Y = MV - Y, where Vis anu u 
estimate of V. 
12. Engle and Granger (1987) shows that co-integrating time series are 
consistent with error correction representation. Engle and Granger 
(1987) also developed some tests for co-integrating series .. One such 
test, which was used here in this paper, is based on running a regression 
of an equilibrium error-correction equation such as (9), (10), (12), 
(13), and (16) and testing a null hypothesis of the Durbin Watson 
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statistics equal to zero. A rejection of this hypothesis means that the 
series are co-integrating, hence error-correction is consistent with the 
data generating process. 
13. Equation (13), however, was estimated directly since this provides better 
results than its corresponding error-correction counterpart both in terms 
of overall fit and other diagnostic properties. 
14. Domowitz and Hakkio (1987), however, showed extimating equations such as 
the ones in (9') - (12') and (16'), are consistent with the following 
intertemporal error-correction loss function: 
00 . * 
L = Et L pJ[Al(RER .-RER .)2t t+J t+Jj=O 
+ (RERt. - RER . 1 )
2 
. +J t+J -
- 2 A(RER j - RER . 1 )(RER 
* . - RER* . 1)]t+ t+J - t+J t+J - ... 
!-;.;:/ 
provided that RER* (the equilibrium RER) follows any process more 
complicated than a random walk. other examples in the literature also 
~ 
includes Hendry (1980a, 1980b); Hendry, Pagan, and Sargan (1984), Nickell 
(1985), and Hendry and van Ungern-Sternberg(l981), to men.tion a few. 
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